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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 03-cr-00322-002)
District Judge: Honorable Legrome D. Davis
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 6, 2009
Before:   McKEE, JORDAN, and LOURIE*, Circuit Judges.
(Filed February 09, 2009)
_______________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________
_______________
*Honorable Alan D. Lourie, Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit sitting by designation.
2
LOURIE, Circuit Judge.
Janis Moore appeals from the decision of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania sentencing her to nine months imprisonment for violation of the
terms of her supervised release.  We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its
discretion in its sentencing decision, and we will therefore affirm.
I. Discussion
In April of 2005, Moore was sentenced to thirty months imprisonment after
pleading guilty to multiple counts of mail fraud.  As part of her sentence, Moore was
required to pay $130,000 in restitution, at a rate of $150 per month.  Upon her release
from prison in January 2007, Moore was placed under supervised release for a period of
three years.  As a condition of her supervised release, the District Court forbade Moore
from opening any new credit accounts or using certain disbursements of income (such as
from tax refunds) without the permission of her probation officer.  Moore violated the
terms of her supervised release when she acquired various credit cards and made
purchases using those cards as well as the proceeds of her 2006 tax refund without
obtaining the permission of her parole officer.
On April 16, 2008, the District Court held a revocation hearing and imposed a
sentence of nine months for the supervised release violation.  The nine-month sentence
was the maximum sentence envisioned by the Sentencing Guidelines, and was five-
months longer than the sentence recommended by the government.  On appeal, Moore
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claims that her sentence is unreasonable, and asks us to vacate the sentence and remand
the matter for a new sentencing hearing.
Moore makes two arguments supporting her request for us to vacate her sentence. 
First, she alleges that the District Court failed to adequately consider the sentencing
factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(e)(3).  Second, she
alleges that the nine-month sentence was, in reality, an effort on the part of the District
Court to punish her further for her underlying conviction, rather than for her breach of
trust.  
We review the reasonableness of a district court’s sentence for abuse of discretion. 
Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 594 (2007).  Moore, as the party challenging the
sentence bears the burden of proving unreasonableness.  See United States v. Lessner, 498
F.3d 185, 204-05 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
We first address Moore’s contention that the District Court erred in failing to
consider the relevant sentencing factors.  Moore acknowledges the fact that the District
Court considered the Sentencing Guidelines (one of the statutory factors), but claims that
the Court “barely took into account” the remaining six factors.  Appellant’s Br. at 16.  We
disagree with Moore that the Court failed to consider the sentencing factors.  In
sentencing decisions, courts are not required to make findings as to each factor if the
record makes clear that the court took the factors into consideration.  United States v.
Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 203 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).  In this case, the record of
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the sentencing proceedings makes clear that the District Court did in fact take the factors
into consideration.  For example, in issuing the sentence, the Court emphasized the first
sentencing factor, the nature and circumstances of the offense, as a basis for its
sentencing decision.  See e.g. App. 52A (stating that the nine-month incarceration would
prevent her from “ignoring and disregarding what the Probation officer has told you that
you can’t do”).  Similarly, the Court, in recognizing that its sentence was greater than that
recommended by the government, stated that granting a “lesser sentence would diminish
the seriousness of [the] offenses.”  That statement demonstrates that the Court considered
the need for the imposed sentence, which is the second of the sentencing factors.  See 18
U.S.C. § 3553 (2006).  Furthermore, it is apparent that the Court took into account the
types of sentences available, but found incarceration to be the appropriate one.  Thus,
Moore has not shown that the Court failed to properly consider the sentencing factors. 
Lastly, we address Moore’s contention that the District Court improperly
resentenced her for her underlying conviction, not for the violation of supervised release. 
In support of her position that the court’s sentence was based on her underlying
conviction, Moore points to the fact that the nine-month sentence was the maximum
sentence recommended by the Guidelines and more than double the four-month sentence
recommended by the government.  We find that evidence unconvincing.  The District
Court is not bound by the sentence recommended by the government.  Furthermore, it can
scarcely be argued that a court abuses its discretion simply by adopting the high end of
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the Sentencing Guidelines.  The Court here reviewed the relevant factors and concluded
that the high end of the Guidelines was appropriate in light of Moore’s violation of her
supervised release.  We therefore conclude that the court did not improperly sentence
Moore based on her original conviction.
II. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s nine-month sentence.
